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Abstract 
In 2011 and 2012, several high profile campaigns spread with unexpected speed and potency. These 
“viral engagements” include the mobilization that scuttled the Stop Online Piracy Act, popular protest 
against the Susan G. Komen Foundation’s decision to stop funding Planned Parenthood, 100 million 
views of the KONY 2012 video on YouTube and its subsequent criticism and defense, and on-line 
activism around the shooting of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida. This paper examines three 
aspects of these viral campaigns as a form of political engagement. First, is there a common structure 
of mobilization and spread? Some have argued that these viral campaigns synthesize conventional 
social and political networks but amplify the messages that spread through those networks through the 
speed of digital communication. Second, what are the potential contributions of this fast, cheap, and 
thin mode of engagement to democracy? We examine the implications of viral engagement for four 
critical democratic values: inclusion, public deliberation, political equality, and civic education. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, the political significance of the Internet has been visible in US Presidential 
campaigns from Howard Dean to Barack Obama. Groups such as MoveOn.org pioneered on-line 
mobilization and advocacy strategies. The rapidly evolving political blogosphere has been the subject 
of both innovation and research.1 
Beyond these precursors, we may look back upon 2011 and 2012 as an inflection point in the 
impact of social media technology upon politics. During that period, a large number of grassroots 
campaigns and other activities – most of them occurring in physical as well as virtual space – met with 
unexpected, largely unpredicted, notoriety and even success. The role of social media such as Twitter 
and Facebook in revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Middle East has received much 
attention.2 In Europe, digital technologies seem to be playing a large role in new political entities such 
as the German Pirate Party and campaigning efforts such as Avaaz.3 
This essay is a preliminary meditation on two main questions about viral engagement: how 
does it work? And, is it good? In section 2 below, we sketch the political structure of viral 
engagement. This kind of discursive and political mobilization is similar to familiar issue-oriented 
campaigns in that a political or social entrepreneur engages in communicative activity to mobilize 
others to support his or her cause. Recent viral engagements are distinctive, however, because digital 
communication technologies and on-line social networks (i) ease the flow of information and so can 
accelerate its spread to millions of others, and (ii) lower the costs of certain kinds of action – 
expressing a “like,” signing a petition, even giving money – on the part of the mobilized. Lower 
barriers to communication and action are what makes it possible for these sorts of campaigns to “go 
viral.” Furthermore, these viral engagements trigger a kind of political engagement that is broadly 
accessible because participation is open to political “beginners” – amateurs, if you like, who engage 
through non-political routes such as participation in on-line social networks.4 
Second, (when) is viral engagement good or bad for democracy? Put crudely, there are two 
polar perspectives on the democratic value of viral engagement. One might view viral engagement as 
the 21st century virtual manifestation of Gustave Le Bon’s 19th century crowd. In this view, viral 
engagement transforms ordinarily reasonable and critical individuals into a collective mass driven by 
largely unconscious forces and simple notions (e.g. propaganda), that is slow to reason, easily 
manipulated by leaders and communicative entrepreneurs, quick to judge and perhaps even to act.5 In 
contrast to this skeptical perspective, a second view is that viral engagement constitutes a 21st century 
version of the Habermassian public sphere. In this view, the digital technologies increase the sensory 
and communicative capabilities of civil society; they accelerate the extent to which “the 
communicative structures of the public sphere constitute a far-flung network of sensors that react to 
the pressure of society-wide problems and stimulate influential opinions.”6 
 
2. Four Examples of Viral Engagement 
To fix ideas, as they say, consider capsule accounts of four recent episodes of viral engagement. 
                                                      
1 See, for example, Karpf (2012); Hindman (2008); Drezner & Farrell (2008); Lawrence, Sides & Farrell (2010); Nahon, 
Hemsley, Walker, & Hussain (2011). 
2 See, for example, Howard & Hussain (2011); Khondker (2011). 
3 On the German Pirate Party, see Meyer (2012); Kron (2012). On Avaaz.org, see Christensen (2011). 
4 In this way, the phenomenon of viral engagement discussed in this chapter resembles the “amateurish” political 
participation described by Shelby and Bertran in their contributions to this volume. 
5 See, famously, Le Bon (1896). 
6 Habermas (1996).  
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A. Kony 2012 
On March 5, 2012, a group called Invisible Children released a short 30-minute film called Kony 2012 
on the YouTube video sharing site.7 The film documented the atrocities led by Ugandan Joseph Kony 
and his army in a highly dramatic, accessible way. As of this writing,8 the video has had over 90 
million views on YouTube and 18 million plays on Vimeo. Kony 2012 hit 100 million views on 
different video websites in just 6 days, making it the fastest video to achieve that viral diffusion ever. 
By comparison, Lady Gaga’s Bad Romance video took 18 days to reach 100 million and Justin 
Bieber’s Baby hit 100 million in 56 days.9 
A data analysis of tweets that mentioned Kony 2012 in the first days after its release shows 
two illuminating trends.10 First, grassroots networks that were cultivated by Invisible Children for 
many years were instrumental in the initial spread of the video. These networks, primarily comprised 
of Christian youth in small and middle-sized cities, set the campaign in motion and were responsible 
for the first 5,000 tweets on the video. Second, Invisible Children strategically engaged celebrities 
who publicly endorsed the campaign video and contributed to its virality.11  
Subsequent to its release, the Kony 2012 video and Invisible Children suffered a barrage of 
criticism from human rights organizations and think tanks such as the African Youth Initiative 
Network12 and the Center for Strategic & International Studies,13 respected intellectuals such as 
Mahmood Mamdani of Columbia University,14 commentators on the pages of the Atlantic,15 Foreign 
Policy,16 and tech-politics digerati such as Ethan Zuckerman17 and Evgeny Morozov.18 19 For better or 
worse (that is precisely the unresolved debate), Kony 2012 made tens of millions of people aware of 
Joseph Kony and in that way its effect on the public debate and public sphere were substantial. We do 
not know whether Kony 2012 affected political decision-makers in Africa, the United States, or 
elsewhere. Before the release of the film, in 2011, President Obama dispatched some 100 special 
operations troops to search for Kony. 
 
B. Susan G. Komen Foundation and Planned Parenthood 
On December 16, 2011, following a unanimous vote of her governing board, the President of the 
Susan G. Komen Foundation for the cure of breast cancer called Planned Parenthood president Cecile 
Richards to inform her that the Foundation was ending funding for her organization and that policy 
                                                      
7 The video was placed on the Vimeo video sharing website even before, on March 2, 2012, but received only a few dozens 
of views in the first couple of days.  
8 September 25, 2012. 
9 Van Grove (2012). 
10  Lotan (2012). 
11  Lotan, id.  
12 Quinn (2012).  
13 Basu (2012). 
14 Mamdani (2012).  
15 Cole (2012).  
16 Keating (2012).  
17 Zuckerman (2012).  
18 Laughland, Strauss, & Salfield (2012). 
19 For a summary of criticism, see Cohen (2012). 
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would bar Planned Parenthood from applying for funding.20 The news did not become public until 
January 31, when the Associated Press broke the story. On that Tuesday, Planned Parenthood 
responded with a press release via Twitter to its tens of thousands of followers: “ALERT: Susan G. 
Komen caves under anti-choice pressure, ends funding for breast cancer screenings at PP health 
centers bit.ly/AloRdK.” The news and outrage against the foundation spread quickly on Facebook, 
Twitter, and various message boards. The Facebook petition in favor of Planned Parenthood received 
more than 100,000 “likes.” That week, Planned Parenthood received a sharp upsurge in donations, and 
political leaders including Senators Barbara Boxer, Frank Lautenberg, Al Franken, Robert Menendez, 
and Kirsten Gillibrand publicly supported Planned Parenthood.21 On February 3, 2012, just four days 
after Planned Parenthood’s social media campaign started, the Susan G. Komen Foundation reversed 
its position, saying that Planned Parenthood was eligible to apply for funding. On February 7, Komen 
Foundation Vice President Karen Handel – a former Georgia Gubernatorial candidate who advocated 
defunding Planned Parenthood – resigned from the Foundation.  
 
C. The Death of Trayvon Martin 
On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch volunteer, shot and killed 17-year-
old Trayvon Martin in the town of Sanford, Florida. Martin was walking home from a convenience 
store, where he had purchased a package of Skittles candy and iced tea. Zimmerman was taken into 
custody and told police that he had shot Martin in self-defense after a fight. No charges were filed and 
Zimmerman was released.22 
The initial media coverage of the story was local and limited. It was mentioned in the Fox 35 
Orlando news program on February 27, and then briefly appeared on the pages of the Orlando Sentinel 
on February 29 and the Miami Herald on March 2.23 The case was not mentioned in the media for the 
next five days and only resurged because of the efforts of Benjamin Crump – the attorney hired by 
Martin’s parents. In an effort to mobilize public pressure to support his case, Crump started using his 
connections and pitching the story to national media.24 The case was eventually featured by Reuters on 
March 7 and CBS coverage followed on March 8. 
On March 8, a young Washington DC lawyer who watched the CBS program created a 
change.org petition calling for Zimmerman’s arrest (and later transferred it to Martin’s parents).25 A 
total of 2,277,952 million people had signed that petition before it closed.26 A number of other 
petitions on the case appeared. Change.org’s communications director, Brianna Bayo-Cotter, reports 
that the Trayvon Martin issue comprised their largest on-line petition drive ever.27 The case garnered 
hundreds of thousands of mentions on Twitter, which multiplied petition signatures and led to wide 
media coverage by all the major news outlets. Throughout the second half of March, popular and some 
elite sentiment built around the case. Supporters wore hooded sweatshirts and “I am Trayvon Martin” 
shirts to express solidarity with the Martins. Al Sharpton, Spike Lee, and NAACP president Ben 
                                                      
20 See Washington Post Staff (2012) 
21 For discussion of social media response, see Warzel (2012). 
22 This narrative draws on a timeline of events posted on CBS News: Dahl (2012). 
23  Stempeck (2012).  
24 Trotta (2012). 
25  Stempeck (2012). 
26 Change.org (2012). 
27 Gray (2012). 
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Jealous all publicly supported the Martins. During the week of March 19-25, 19% of all news 
coverage in the country was dedicated to Trayvon’s case.28  
On March 23, President Barack Obama issued a statement on the case indicating that he 
thought it should be investigated, saying “If I had a son, he’d look like Trayvon.” During the week of 
March 26-30, the death of Trayvon Martin became the most discussed topic on Twitter.29 Florida 
Governor Rick Perry appointed state attorney Angela Corey as a special prosecutor to look into the 
case. Earlier that week, the Sanford chief of policy Bill Lee announced that he would temporarily 
“resign.” On April 11, 2012, Special Prosecutor Corey announced that Zimmerman would be charged 
with second degree murder. 
 
D. Stop Online Piracy Act / Protect Intellectual Property Act 
On May 12, 2011, Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced the Protect IP Act into the Senate with 11 bi-
partisan co-sponsors. Later that year, in October 2011, Lamar Smith (R-TX) introduced similar 
legislation, called the Stop Online Piracy Act, into the U.S. House. In their early days, both bills 
enjoyed broad bipartisan support. By late 2011, a broad-based discussion on technology and 
technology-policy sites surfaced serious criticisms of PIPA/SOPA – in particular the worry that these 
laws would create a chilled environment for speech on the Internet by opening many routes to private 
and governmental censorship.30 Participants in this discussion, and those evidently moved by it, 
include a large community of technologists, important technology companies and non-profit 
organizations, and a number of technology policy-makers inside and outside of the Obama 
administration.  
According to Yochai Benkler’s careful account, much of the discussion of the consequences 
of PIPA/SOPA unfolded on technology industry and internet freedom websites such as techdirt.com 
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.31 This discussion transformed into a mobilization against 
PIPA/SOPA that had several components. 
On the popular, social media, front, more than seven million users had signed a Google 
petition against PIPA/SOPA by early 2012.32 A Wikipedia page against SOPA/PIPA received 162 
million page views, and eight million of those visitors used an on-line form to contact their political 
representatives.33 Three million tweets mentioned PIPA or SOPA. A second group, reinforcing and 
amplifying the first, consisted of powerful technology entities. On November 16, 2011, Tumblr 
blocked out every word, image, and video on each user’s dashboard to highlight the harm of 
censorship.34 Reddit urged its users to oppose PIPA/SOPA and to boycott companies, such as 
GoDaddy.com, that supported the legislation. On January 18, 2012, many large tech companies and 
web communities participated in a web strike: Google changed its logo to include a “censored” 
graphic; Wikipedia went black; and Reddit, Craigslist, WordPress, Pinterest, Amazon, and Flickr also 
participated. 
                                                      
28  Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (2012a).  
29  Hitlin & Tan (2012). 
30 See this excellent discussion by Howard (2011). 
31 Benkler (2012). 
32 See “SOPA petition gets millions of signatures as internet piracy legislation protests continue,” Washington Post, Jan. 19, 
2012. (URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-petition-gets-millions-of-signatures-as-internet-
piracy-legislation-protests-continue/2012/01/19/gIQAHaAyBQ_story.html; 
https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550/posts/WyqtYzsuJMT. ) 
33 Howard, Alex (2012). 
34 Jenkins (2012).  
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The political results of this mobilization were immediate and dramatic. During the day of the 
blackout, six Senate PIPA sponsors –  Marco Rubio, Orrin Hatch, Kelly Ayotte, Roy Blunt, John 
Boozman, and Mark Kirk – withdrew their support. On that same day, more than 110 Senators and 
Representatives issued public statements in opposition to PIPA or SOPA.35 Subsequently, Senator 
Majority Leader Harry Reid posted the vote and Representative Lamar S. Smith put the bill on hold. 
 
3. Viral Engagement: An Account 
 
A. The Ask 
In each of these four cases, viral engagement begins when a set of political entrepreneurs asks a 
broader public to take note of what they consider to be an important public issue. This “ask” consists 
of three components. 
First, the entrepreneur provides information about the topic that is new or unknown to much of 
the audience and that is presented as urgent and plainly unjust: there was a mass murderer who 
enslaved children in Uganda named Joseph Kony; the Susan G. Komen Foundation stopped funding 
planned parenthood; a teenage boy was shot in Florida; important bi-partisan bills that limit Internet 
freedom were winding their way through the House and Senate. 
Second, the entrepreneur develops a narrative, or “frames”36 the issue in a way that identifies 
the injustice at stake and so serves to locate the issue in the world view of the audience and highlight 
its salience. The slogan “I am Trayvon Martin” captured the framing of that issue perfectly. Kony 
2012 made the problem salient to the audience powerfully through the narrator’s dialogue about Kony 
with his five-year-old son, Gavin – the injustice is plain even to a child. Planned Parenthood 
successfully described the Komen Foundation’s defunding decision as an unwarranted political attack 
that sacrificed women’s health. PIPA/SOPA opponents framed the legislative proposals as 
jeopardizing freedom on the Internet by paving the way for governmental and corporate censors (the 
slogan on the blacked-out homepage of Wikipedia warned “Imagine a world without free 
knowledge”). 
Third, based on this new information set in a narrative of injustice, the entrepreneur asks her 
audience to take action. The simplest action is simply to click “like” on Facebook or view a video or 
other media. Media and page views – and as the capsule descriptions of Kony 2012 views and views 
of the Wikipedia anti-PIPA/SOPA page show – are easy to count and increasingly reported as a 
statistic to measure the success of Internet campaigns. More costly and time-consuming asks may 
include boycotting commercial companies (PIPA/SOPA), signing petitions (Trayvon Martin, the 
Planned Parenthood protest at the Komen Foundation decision, PIPA/SOPA), contacting political 
officials (Kony 2012, PIPA/SOPA), and physically participating in public demonstrations and protests 
(Trayvon Martin).  
 
B. Virality 
These three characteristics of the “ask” are common to every political and social campaign.37 The vast 
majority of off-line and on-line asks fail to go viral. What is distinctive about these four cases of an 
“ask” is that (i) they occurred largely on-line and that (ii) these on-line campaigns spread quickly and 
widely, engaging millions of people over a very short time.  
                                                      
35 ProPublica (2012). 
36 Benford & Snow (2000); Gamson (1992). 
37 See, e.g., Fredricks (2010).  
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Digital technologies make viral engagement possible first by dramatically lowering the costs 
of publishing, broadcasting, and recommending appealing asks. It becomes possible for a relatively 
small organization to produce the sophisticated, professional Kony 2012 video.38 Trayvon Martin’s 
supporters broadcast their ask to the entire world at almost no cost. Digital technology facilitates the 
spread of asks through social networks, as one user who finds the ask compelling easily re-asks her 
friends through email, by re-tweeting to followers, sharing on Facebook, and so on. Finally, digital 
technologies reduce the costs of acting and responding to the ask through very low-cost actions – 
viewing, clicking to sign a petition, and electronically contacting politicians, other public officials, and 
organizational elites. 
A campaign that goes viral, then, has five relevant characteristics from the democratic point of 
view. 
First, almost anyone can initiate the ask. In the pre-internet era, the engagement and support of 
professional organizations and activists was necessary to voice a concern or point to an injustice. 
Digital technologies have substantially lowered the threshold for signing a petition, opening a 
Facebook group, or spreading the word about the ask on Twitter or in the blogosphere.  
Second, the ask (and response) spreads quickly to millions of people. That quick and broad 
spread is part of the definition of “viral.” The ask spreads because each user asks additional users to 
participate. According to Adam Penenberg’s Viral Loop (2009), such a campaign will “go viral” when 
each user on average engages 1.2 or more new users in the campaign. 
Third, most of those who engage in the viral campaign act in relatively shallow, low-cost 
ways. This ease of action has caused many to criticize on-line political activity as ineffective 
“slacktivism.”39 We agree that the cost is low and the action relatively shallow, but these critics’ 
skeptical conclusions are too quickly drawn. 
Fourth, viral campaigns bring new issues, or new perspectives on familiar issues before the 
public’s gaze. Typically, these issues present an urgent matter or an injustice that could be fixed by the 
ask. While many of these matters may be controversial or nuanced, the campaigns tend to present 
them as a clear and unequivocal call for action. This was the core of the controversy with Kony 2012 – 
critics contended that the campaign presented complex matters in African politics in an overly shallow 
(even if easily comprehensible) manner. 
Fifth, viral campaigns engage new audiences – millions of individuals – who were not 
previously engaged in that issue or in that particular way. Kony 2012 illustrates this phenomenon 
remarkably. The modal viewer was not the reader of Foreign Policy magazine. Instead, YouTube 
viewer statistics show that the video was most popular with 13–17-year-old girls.40  
 
C. The Political Structure and Institutional Context of Viral Engagement 
The democratic value of viral engagement depends not just on the nature of the ask or its viral uptake 
but also on the broader institutional and social consequences of a campaign. We propose a simple 
schema, seen in Figure 1, with which to consider the political structure and institutional context of 
viral engagement. 
We have discussed the first two elements of this structure – (i) the ask, and (ii) its reception –
immediately above. We need three additional elements to analyze the democratic consequences of 
viral engagement. 
                                                      
38 Invisible Children spent less than $1 million USD on all of their materials produced in 2011 (Davies (2012). 
39 Morozov (2009); Gladwell (2010). 
40 See the YouTube statistics page for Kony 2012, URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc (accessed on 
May 26, 2012). 
Viral Engagement 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Political Structure of Viral Engagement 
 
 
 
In all four of our campaigns, (iii) mainstream media coverage played an important role in bringing the 
attention of broader publics (and probably policymakers) to the issue and the viral campaign itself. In 
all four cases, media coverage helped the campaign to bring on board additional interest groups and 
traditional organizations that would support the cause of the campaign. Interestingly, in all four cases a 
combination of mainstream and social media set the wheels of the campaigns in motion. In some 
cases, such as Trayvon Martin and Susan G. Komen, initial coverage by traditional news outlets led to 
intense discussions in the social media, which fuelled further coverage by traditional media sources.41 
In other cases, such as Kony 2012 and PIPA/SOPA, social media led the way and traditional media 
only joined later, when the story was already “trending” on Twitter and Facebook. In several of these 
cases (Kony 2012, PIPA/SOPA, and Susan G. Komen as well), the viral campaign and engagement 
was a story as much as the issue itself.42 This media coverage accelerates the viral campaign itself, as 
people who come to know of the campaigns visit the campaign sites and so experience their asks 
directly.  
Another important category of actors consists of (iv) organizations and associations with an 
interest in the issue who comment on, join, or oppose the viral campaign. Kony 2012 caused groups to 
line up for and against the effort. The NAACP and others joined the Trayvon Martin campaign. The 
role of organizations and associations is perhaps most prominent in the PIPA/SOPA campaign, which 
drew the support of non-profit organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and 
Wikipedia, as well as corporations such as Google, Amazon, Reddit, and GoDaddy. As with media 
intermediaries, the relationship between the viral campaign and interested organizations is reciprocal. 
Such organizations are more likely to involve themselves as a viral campaign grows and their 
                                                      
41 Almost half of the 5 million visits to the Change.org petition period were referred by social media (Stempeck (2012)). 
42 This statement is based on author impressions, not content analysis of news coverage. 
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involvement in turn draws greater public and media attention and so feeds the growth of the viral 
campaign. As the cases of Kony 2012, Trayvon Martin, and PIPA/SOPA show, endorsements by 
celebrities are also instrumental in accelerating the virality of the campaign. 
The results of viral campaigns may range from general awareness-raising to concrete actions 
taken by policymakers. In all four of our cases, the decision-makers and organizations targeted by the 
viral campaigns arguably responded to them and took the requested action. The Susan G. Komen 
Foundation restored funding eligibility for Planned Parenthood and officers of the organization 
resigned. Governor Rick Perry appointed a Special Prosecutor to investigate the Trayvon Martin 
shooting and she brought charges against George Zimmerman. PIPA and SOPA were introduced with 
bipartisan support but sponsors of both pieces of legislation withdrew their support in January 2012. 
The effect of Kony 2012 is perhaps most difficult to assess – funding for the soldiers who are hunting 
Joseph Kony might have continued even without the video and viral campaign. 
—— 
With this conceptual apparatus – an account of viral engagement and its institutional political context 
– in hand, the rest of this essay considers the effect of viral engagement upon four critical democratic 
values: inclusion, political equality, public deliberation, and civic education. It is important to note that 
we are not assessing the democratic worthiness of the goals or policy outcomes of a viral campaign. 
Our objective is to examine the democratic virtues of the viral engagement process, being neutral with 
regard to the desirability of its objectives.  
 
4. Inclusion 
Part of the ideal of a democratic society is that all citizens should be included in the binding decisions 
and collective actions of that society. The universal franchise is one institutionalization of the ideal of 
inclusion. Formal and informal barriers to voting detract from the realization of the ideal of inclusion. 
Even with an unimpeded and universal franchise that gives all citizens a right and opportunity to 
participate in political processes, however, worries about inclusion remain. In the contemporary 
American context, millions rarely participate in politics because they don’t know, they don’t care, or 
no one asks them. Can the opportunities and asks of viral engagement increase inclusion? Or, will 
viral engagement exacerbate problems of exclusion? 
First, the digital social networks on which viral engagement spreads may be a more common 
and accessible medium for acquiring political information.43 Some may be accustomed to acquiring 
news and other information through on-line sources in addition to conventional routes of political 
communication such as television, radio, civic associations, and face-to-face conversations, and some 
may even prefer on-line sources.44 The opposite argument, however, stresses the way in which access 
to information and communication technologies correlates with other dimensions of advantage – 
income, education, professional status. From this digital divide perspective, the people who are 
excluded from the conventional channels of political information and action will also be excluded 
from digital channels of participation. This is not the place to settle this debate – but only to note that 
as information and communication technologies become cheaper and shift increasingly to mobile 
modalities, the breath of the digital divide may be shrinking.45 
A second factor looks not to the medium, or even the message, but to the people who deliver 
messages through that medium. The digital networks through which viral engagement spreads are 
                                                      
43  This is particularly true for youth. See Cohen & Kahne (2012). 
44 Zickuhr & Smith (2012).  
45 Horrigan (2009): “Wireless connectivity has drawn many users more deeply into digital life”. See also, Cohen & Kahne 
(2012).  
Viral Engagement 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
social. That means that individuals often receive political information and asks not just through 
another impersonal medium – although there are plenty of direct-mail type solicitations over electronic 
mail – but as recommended links, articles, and videos from family, friends, and acquaintances whom 
they have deliberately “friended” or followed on social networks like Facebook and Twitter. This 
social aspect of the new digital media may address the kinds of exclusion that arise: of personal 
alienation from conventional political organizations and other mainstream institutions. This dynamic 
may well have been manifest in the spread of the Kony 2012 video among 13–17-year-old girls, its 
most popular demographic. 
Third, digital communication technologies lower the cost of action: of responding to the “ask” 
that one watches a video, “likes” a post or group, e-signs a petition, or clicks through a page to contact 
official decision-makers on behalf of a cause. The availability of these new tools for political action 
blurs the boundaries between traditional elites and groups that have been excluded from political life. 
As the range of valid political activities expands and the cost of these activities declines, the public 
sphere opens up to new voices. Sub-groups who are excluded from political life may find the costs of 
digitally mediated political action especially low – compared to their politically and socially included 
counterparts – for two reasons. First, they might be comfortable with digital communication and action 
because that is how they often socialize and transact in non-political areas of life. Second, they might 
find traditional venues of political action – such as going to a community meeting, signing a 
canvasser’s petition, donating money, or even entering a voting booth – strange or off-putting 
compared to digital action.  
 
5. Political Equality 
A second critical democratic value is that all citizens should be counted equally in public decisions 
and that they should enjoy equal opportunities to exercise political influence. Despite universal 
franchise, many factors stand in the way of the value of political equality in the contemporary 
American political-economy. Consider two of them: a social background of unequally distributed 
resources and asymmetric incentives to organize and influence public policies. 
Every society is marked by some inequality in the distribution of social and economic 
resources across it population. The degree to which material inequality creates problems for political 
equality depends upon (i) the extent of material inequality and (ii) the ease with which individuals can 
translate their economic and social power into political influence. Both of these factors pose especially 
great challenges to political equality in contemporary American society. The extent of material 
inequality is so great that some critics say that the United States has become a “winner take all 
society.”46 The barriers between money and politics have never been particularly high in the United 
States. However, recent Constitutional decisions and political practices have made them lower than 
they have ever been before.47 As a result of these factors, political scientists have found that policy 
decisions are especially sensitive to those in the top ten percent of the income distribution and not at 
all sensitive to the middle of the distribution or below.48 
A second challenge to political equality stems from asymmetries in the motives to organize to 
exert political influence. Many political scientists have established that the politics of making laws and 
regulations often favor those who have especially deep interests in some particular policy domain even 
                                                      
46 Hacker and Pierson (2011). 
47 See, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010). For a thorough discussion of the effects of money on 
politics, see Lessig (2011). 
48 See Gilens (2005).  
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when there are many other people who stand to suffer but have only weak interests in the issue.49 This 
theory, for example, predicts that it would be difficult to pass stringent environmental regulation even 
though there are millions who would benefit from cleaner air or water because a few (e.g. factory 
owners) would stand to lose much more per person because it is easier for the smaller group to 
organize themselves and influence the policy that potentially hurts them. Many public policies involve 
this kind of asymmetry between a small group which stands to lose (or win) a lot per person on one 
side of a public policy and a much larger group that stands to win (or lose) a small amount per person 
on the other side of the policy. This includes regulation of all kinds, and in particular public subsidies 
(think of agricultural subsidies) and procurement policies (think of entrenched defense or 
infrastructure contractors). 
Viral engagement addresses these two challenges to political equality if it mobilizes people 
directly to countervail the political influence of money and entrenched organizations. This argument 
relies on a claim about the distinctive nature of on-line viral campaigns. Digital social network 
dynamics lower the barriers to spreading information and injustice frames and to politically relevant 
action ((i) and (ii) in figure 1 above) so that these on-line appeals unleash the social and political 
values of those whom traditional forms of interest group organizing have failed to organize or 
mobilize. 
The potential of viral engagement as a countervailing power is perhaps most clearly evident in 
the PIPA/SOPA debacle. When those two pieces of legislation were first introduced, they enjoyed a 
bipartisan consensus. Initially, the industries and interest groups (such as the US Chamber of 
Commerce and the Motion Picture Association of America) who stood to benefit were the only vocal 
voices. As described in Section 2.D. above, a quick and broadly based mobilization of millions 
quickly changed the political tide and challenged the two pieces of legislation. 
An important objection to this sentiment is that viral engagement may turn out to undermine 
political equality rather than advancing it. As examples such as the four discussed in this essay 
become more common and better understood, political entrepreneurs may develop an art and craft of 
making asks go viral on digital social networks. As this persuasion industry develops, we may find 
that asks crafted with the support of lavish resources are much more likely to go viral than less well-
funded asks. If the effectiveness of viral asks is highly “elastic” with regard to the resources backing 
them, then viral engagement is likely to become just another form of professional campaigning that 
reflects the underlying inequality of resources.  
Even if it turns out that effective viral asks require lavish resources, political equality may not 
suffer unless one further condition is met: that people can be manipulated through these asks into 
acting against their own beliefs or interests. In each of our four cases of viral engagement, it is 
plausible that people responded to the ask for action because the ask touched their deeply-held beliefs 
and interests. This link between viral engagement and pre-existing beliefs, values, or interests provides 
a safeguard for political equality; if it holds, at least viral engagement will not make our politics more 
unequal. It may be the case, however, that clever political entrepreneurs may be able to manipulate 
information and frames so that people engage in viral campaigns that actually damage their own 
interests.50 The likelihood of viral campaigns becoming a propaganda tool is currently unclear – the 
rarity and novelty of genuine viral engagement does not allow for a conclusive assessment.  
 
 
                                                      
49 See, for example: Wilson (1984); Stigler (1971); Lowi (1979). 
50 The emerging literature on “viral marketing” can be particularly handy for these purposes. Recent studies examine the 
factors that make viral videos appealing and persuasive and suggest how to replicate them. See, e.g., Ho & Dempsey 
(2008). 
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6. Public Deliberation 
A third critical value is public deliberation: collective decisions and actions should be based upon a 
broad public consideration of contending reasons, arguments, and evidence that appeal to everyone 
who is affected by them. Put this way, it may seem that viral engagement is the opposite of public 
deliberation. The “asks” of viral engagement typically involve emotionally charged, one-sided, 
appeals that are designed to motivate action rather than a considered balancing of reasons and 
evidence on all sides of a question.  
Many cases of viral campaigns are criticized because they spread false rumors or even hate 
speech.51 Similarly, some of the criticism of the Kony 2012 video, for example, focused on its partial 
use of the facts – Joseph Kony is believed to be no longer in Uganda and the forces under his 
command are now a pale shadow of what they once were. Other critics argued that Kony 2012 drew 
unwarranted public attention to a problem that ranked relatively low on the schedule of Africa’s most 
urgent concerns regarding human development or human rights. Similarly, much of the commentary 
surrounding the PIPA/SOPA legislation stressed worst case scenarios of public censorship. 
Unsurprisingly, the petition statement that Trayvon Martin’s supporters signed on change.org did not 
suggest any of the possible justifications for George Zimmerman’s actions.  
The discourse composed directly of viral engagement – by the ask and its immediate reception 
– will rarely constitute a fair-minded consideration of the issue at hand. However, neither the 
beginning nor the end of public consideration of an issue is coterminous with on-line viral engagement 
around that issue. For this reason, we argue that viral engagements typically contribute to the quality 
of public deliberation and decision-making for three reasons.  
First, the “ask” in a viral engagement typically occurs in response to perceived shortcomings 
in some ongoing public debate or sequence of decisions. Responses, coming initially in the form of the 
“asks” of political entrepreneurs, introduce novel information, arguments, or perspectives into the 
public debate, or at least bring those discursive elements before audiences who were previously 
unaware of them. Beyond the substantive information – the harmful consequences of intellectual 
property regulation or the politicization of a women’s health decision – viral engagements also provide 
the public and decision makers with the information that many millions of people seem to care about 
(or at least be reasonably interested in) the issue that is the focus of the online campaign. Thus, viral 
engagements contribute to the quality of public deliberation by articulating a counterpoint to the 
prevailing currents of discussion and action. 
Second, the arguments made by the entrepreneurs who begin a viral campaign and are aired 
within that campaign offer only one input into a broader public debate. The perspectives and 
interpretations of a viral campaign are never the last or only word, and seldom are they the most 
powerful voice. If the only arguments – or the hegemonic ones – about intellectual property were 
those made in the anti-PIPA/SOPA campaign or we had no other perspectives about United States 
foreign policy in Africa other than those of Kony 2012, those viral campaigns would indeed have 
detracted mightily from the quality of public deliberation. But those perspectives were simply not 
hegemonic, and so worries that viral campaigns will dominate public discourse are misplaced. 
Structurally, they cannot dominate. As figure 1 highlights, the entrepreneurs who seek to spark a viral 
campaign constitute only one actor in a much larger political system that includes many other interest 
groups, media, and governments and other decision-makers. In a free society, those other groups will 
articulate their contrasting perspectives and arguments. 
Third, viral campaigns often enrich subsequent public discussion by pressing those other 
organizations to become more articulate and public regarding their reasons and arguments in the 
                                                      
51  A recent and powerful example is the movie trail “The Innocence of Muslims”, which went viral and led to violent 
protests in the Muslim world. See e.g., Marantz (2012).  
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public sphere and in institutional spaces. Kony 2012 sparked many rich discussions in varied media 
ranging from Foreign Policy to the New York Times. Blog posts on technology and culture have 
explored the boundary-testing and protecting nature of the ensuing debate: do adolescent girls have a 
place in foreign policy discussions?52 Public sociologists used Kony 2012 to explore the colonial 
character of US foreign policy interventions, even those justified by the desire to safeguard human 
rights.53 The video created an occasion for human rights advocates and foreign policy intellectuals to 
debate the future of intervention in Africa and the wisdom of trying to apprehend Joseph Kony. And 
the Kony 2012 video brought these debates to the attention of millions who were previously ignorant 
or apathetic about the issue. Viral engagement around the Trayvon Martin controversy triggered a 
searching reconsideration of the shooting in institutional space: the appointment of a special 
prosecutor and a second degree murder charge. It would of course be an enormous loss for public 
deliberation and for criminal justice if the massive petition campaign somehow sealed George 
Zimmerman’s fate, but that is not how public campaigns work in democratic societies governed by the 
rule of law. What the Trayvon Martin campaign did do was highlight a potential mistake by local law 
enforcement officials. The subsequent investigation and prosecution will follow its own procedures 
and rules of evidence, although those procedures will likely be more carefully scrutinized as a result of 
viral engagement. 
It is important to note that virality can also work in anti-deliberative ways. For example, 
information cascades (Watts 2002) can spread false information or a social graph might be constructed 
in such a way that beliefs and arguments are polarized in segregated social echo chambers (Sunstein 
2009). Although this is not the occasion to engage in an analysis of what separates deliberative from 
non-deliberative virality, the four cases described above exhibit deliberative qualities because the kind 
of public dialogue in which they figure incorporates heterogeneous views in ongoing exchange. 
 
7. Civic Education 
A fourth critical value is civic education. A democratic society must create mechanisms for its citizens 
to learn “virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation.”54 Is viral engagement 
such a mechanism? 
Skeptics might say that the quick and shallow nature of viral engagement prevents this kind of 
on-line political engagement from conferring any meaningful educative benefit to those who engage in 
it. According to this line of thinking, the low-cost of viral engagement also makes it low-value, 
civically speaking. Unlike participating in a church or union meeting or working on a political 
campaign, clicking on a “like” button on one’s web browser does not provide much training in 
citizenship. Furthermore, in a much-noted article, Malcolm Gladwell has argued that strong social 
networks – the bonds of close friendship and solidarity – were a necessary component of civic 
education in social movements such as the US civil rights protests. The on-line social networks 
through which viral engagement spreads, he argues, are composed of weak ties between hundreds of 
virtual friends with whom one has little meaningful contact or even common interest.55 
But why does a citizen – or a critic – have to choose between on-line engagement and 
traditional social protest or other political activity? Part of the concern from the “slacktivism” view 
seems to regard not so much the low value of viral engagement itself, but the worry that such on-line 
activity will crowd out higher value activities which are more meaningful, effective, and educative 
                                                      
52 Jenkins (2012). 
53 Mamdani (2012). 
54 Gutmann (1987). 
55 Gladwell (2010). 
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such as traditional political or community organizing. An implicit component of Gladwell’s argument 
is that these protesters are tweeting and “liking” instead of sitting-in and demonstrating.  
If there is some sort of zero-sum displacement dynamic at work – if individuals have a fixed 
budget for political activity that can go either into on-line engagement and conventional political 
activity and if online activity is less educative – then worries about slacktivism are justified. We know 
of no empirical evidence to support this displacement thesis, however. 56 In fact, existing evidence 
suggests that online engagement may strengthen traditional forms of political participation, at least 
among the youth.57 
Given such evidence, consider the following two possibilities. First, the amount of on-line 
engagement may or may not be related to conventional political activity. For participants, different 
motivations and opportunities may govern participation in these two distinct spheres. If viral 
engagement does not displace other political action, however, then it should count as a net positive for 
civic education. Although participants may not experience the deep personal transformations of those 
who engage in demanding activism like the Freedom Rides, viral engagement does bring new 
information to and awaken a modest kind of interest (enough to take the time to watch a video or 
complete a web form) in millions who would have not been otherwise engaged. Moreover, it allows 
previously uninformed individuals to take symbolic and expressive action in spheres that used to be in 
the sole domain of professional and committed political activists.58 If viral engagements become more 
common – with people considering whether or not to respond to different sorts of asks several times a 
week – the experience may not be akin to often walking through a public square with many speakers 
on soap-boxes. As real soap-boxes are prohibited by anti-loitering laws, citizens may come to learn 
about many issues and learn some of the routes to influencing public decisions through viral 
campaigns. 
Another possibility, as likely as the others, is that viral engagement is a “gateway drug” to 
more intense forms of political activism. As a fast, cheap, and low-cost form of engagement, it may be 
for many the lowest rung on a ladder of engagement:59 37% of the people who visited Trayvon 
Martin’s change.org petition signed it.60 A small percentage of those who signed also shared the 
petition on their social networks. An even smaller percentage of these individuals participated in street 
protests and other more demanding, sustained, political activities. The example of the German Pirate 
Party is illuminating in this context. The party was started by a group of internet activists as an online 
campaign against intrusive copyright legislation in Europe, but later took shape as a more consolidated 
political unit, participated in German elections, and won seats in local governments and state 
parliaments in the country.61  
Even if an on-line ask is the lowest, and not only, rung on a ladder of activism, different kinds 
of viral campaigns may be better or worse for civic education. When an organization or coalition 
utilizes viral engagement as part of a long term strategy to build a political constituency – as with 
                                                      
56 For a summary of research that finds that there is no displacement effect of conventional political activity by on-line 
activism, see: Christensen (2011). 
57 A report on “The Internet and Civic Education” found that “those who use blogs or social networking sites politically are 
much more likely to be invested in other forms of civic and political activism. Compared to those who go online but do 
not post political or social content, or to those who do not go online in the first place, members of this group are much 
more likely to take part in other civic activities such as joining a political or civic group, contacting a government 
official, or expressing themselves in the media.” See Smith, Scholzman, Verba, & Brady (2009).  
58 Tufekci (2012). 
59  The “ladder of engagement” argument is common among political activists. For a classic account, see Arnstein (1969). 
60 Stempeck (2012).  
61  Kron (2012). 
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Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 video or perhaps the organizations behind the campaign to defeat 
PIPA/SOPA – we can expect that organization or coalition to use viral engagement as a way to 
identify supporters who can be recruited into repeated and more intensive kinds of activity and so 
provide effective opportunities for civic education. Other viral engagements, however, aim to change a 
particular decision with less interest in building a lasting constituency.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In the pages above, we have offered some speculative reflections on the potential contribution of 
online viral engagement to democratic governance. Two important shifts of perspective were 
important in composing these reflections. First, viral engagement is composed of many different kinds 
of actors, not just participants in the engagement itself: political entrepreneurs initiate that 
engagement, and power interest groups and intermediaries respond to it and amplify its spread. 
Second, we view any episode of viral engagement as occurring in the context of highly flawed 
political institutions and an ongoing process of public debate and decision-making that unfolds over 
time. Perhaps it is this second shift that makes us relatively sanguine about the democratic 
contributions of viral engagement. For us, the question is not whether participation in a campaign like 
the fight to stop PIPA/SOPA is itself egalitarian or deliberative, but whether the existence of that 
campaign advances, from the status quo ante, values like political equality or public deliberation. 
Further, we do not aim to assess the worthiness or desirability of the objectives of a viral campaign, 
but only examine the democratic virtues that are part of the viral engagement process. With the 
caveats that instances of viral engagement are still relatively rare and new, and that there is not much 
empirical research to draw upon, online campaigns that go viral have the potential to enhance 
inclusion, political equality, public deliberation, and civic engagement. 
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